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Abstract—Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Web Ser-
vices (WS) offer advanced flexibility and interoperability capa-
bilities. However they imply significant performance overheads
that need to be carefully considered.
Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Traceability systems
are an interesting domain for the use of WS technologies that are
usually deemed to be too complex and unnecessary in practical
applications, especially regarding security.
This paper presents an externalized security architecture that
uses the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
authorization standard to enforce visibility restrictions on trace-
ability data in a supply chain where multiple companies collabo-
rate; the performance overheads are assessed by comparing ‘raw’
authorization implementations - Access Control Lists, Tokens,
and RDF Assertions - with their XACML-equivalents.
Keywords-Web Services; Authorization; XACML; Perfor-
mance; Supply Chain Traceability
I. INTRODUCTION
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) [1] and Web Services
(WS) [2] were envisioned to cope with constant software
change and to simplify the interoperation of heterogeneous
systems. WS-related standards1 address non-functional con-
cerns such as security, transactions, and reliable messaging.
However, the complexity of these standards, alone and com-
bined, raises significant performance concerns.
The main criticism against the use of WS technologies
is that they are slow and difficult to use. The performance
overheads have been measured in practical implementations.
Juric at al. [3] compared the performance of SOAP with
platform-specific technologies, namely, with Java Remote
Method Invocation (RMI). They reported that a typical SOAP
message is, on average, 4.3 times larger than an RMI message,
and that the WS response time is 9 times slower than RMI.
1WS is used here as an ‘umbrella’ term that refers to most variants
of eXtensible Markup Language (XML) message formats and protocols
built to provide data services, including SOAP messages containing headers
(metadata) and body (payload), and also Representational State Transfer
(REST) that provides granular access to resources.
If WS-Security [4] technologies are used, then the overheads
are even more significant: messages are 27 times larger, and
response times are 15 times slower.
The main reason for these overheads was found to be the
use of verbose XML data encoding for the message formats.
The data access mode is also relevant. Bayardo et. al [5] found
in their study that stream-based data access gives significantly
better performance than document-based access.
In this paper, we investigate the performance of using
WS authorizations in the supply chain traceability domain.
Dynamic authorization is necessary because there are multiple
companies involved, they are distributed across the world, and
many of them do not have prior knowledge of the others.
A. Supply Chain Traceability
The world economy depends on countless supply chains
that provide goods from producer to consumer. Supply Chain
Management (SCM) solutions focus on planning and execu-
tion, integrated with companies’ Enterprise Resources Plan-
ning (ERP) systems. Their purpose is to optimize the physical
object flows so that goods travel in the least amount of time
and at the lowest cost [6]. To achieve this goal, it is necessary
to keep track of what is moving along the supply chain.
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology [7] can
significantly improve supply chain traceability, by allowing
automatic data capture by RFID readers of identifiers stored
inside RFID tags attached to items and/or pallets. Captured
data is stored by each company at dispersed data silos.
The Electronic Product Code (EPC) Network architec-
ture [8] defines standard data capture and query interface for
repositories of RFID data, called the EPC Information Services
(EPC IS) [9]. EPC Discovery Services (EPC DS) [10] [11]
can index these scattered repositories and allow traceability
queries [12], such as Track (Where is the item?) and Trace
(Where has the item been?) to be efficiently answered.
Each supply chain participant can benefit from exchanging
data with other companies, but information such as the levels
of demand, inventory, and supplier identities should be kept
private in a restricted circle of trust. Data access control is
crucial if companies will be willing to share data [13].
B. Overview
This paper compares the performance of visibility restriction
approaches for supply chains using an authorization compo-
nent of an externalized security architecture that relies on
SOA principles and WS-related technologies; ‘raw’ implemen-
tations are compared with equivalent policies in a standard
authorization language to measure the overheads.
In the next section, the traceability system architecture for
the supply chain domain is described. Then the externalized
security architecture is presented with specific focus on au-
thorization. Next we describe the supply chain authorization
implementations along with their conversion to a standard
authorization language. The paper ends with the performance
assessment, conclusions and future work prospects.
II. TRACEABILITY SYSTEM
There are several architecture proposals to build traceability
systems. Pardal and Alves Marques [14] summarized them
using the criteria of centralization and data integration. For
this work the Meta-Data Integration (MDI) architecture was
chosen as the reference because it is aligned with the EPC
Network architecture [8], defining two system layers:
• EPC IS servers collect the detailed event data;
• EPC DS servers store data links to EPC IS servers.
Using this approach, traceability data sharing policies can
be authored by the data owner and then used both at EPC DS
and IS layers, as depicted in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. XACML authorization policies protect both EPC DS and IS.
III. EXTERNALIZED SECURITY
The goal of the externalized security architecture is to
unify the security management across applications so that
business rules can be changed dynamically. For this reason,
it is especially suited to virtualized cloud deployments [15].
Externalized security encompasses user management, au-
thentication, authorization, logging and auditing. The secu-
rity properties to be preserved from attacks are depicted
in Figure 2. Companies have to be authenticated and data
ResourceAction
Subject
Environment
Authentication
Authorization
Non repudiation
Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Auditing
User 
management
Fig. 2. Security properties.
access must be authorized. The authentication can be achieved
with identity providers [16] and the exchange of SAML
assertions [17]. The authorization can be achieved with
XACML [18] that is an XML vocabulary to represent autho-
rization policies and requests that avoids hard-coded rules and
allows improved consistency of policy enforcement. Hebig et
al. [19] demonstrated how the different technologies needed
for externalized security can work together.
A. eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
XACML [18] allows fine-grained access control and com-
bination of (possibly conflicting) policies in an externalized
security architecture. In general terms, an authorization is
the verification of a subject’s right to execute an action on
a resource. The standard defines a policy format, follows a
processing model and requires actual implementation.
1) Policy: Figure 3 presents a simplified XACML Policy
structure with target and rules.
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Fig. 3. XACML simplified Policy model.
The target defines a simplified set of conditions that de-
termine if the policy is relevant for the request. Rules are
conditions that evaluate to ‘Permit’, ‘Deny’, ‘NotApplicable’
(when no target matches), or ‘Indeterminate’ (when internal
errors occur). XACML has a set of predefined functions that
are used to transform and compare data attributes, to arrive at
an outcome.
Policies are declarative and do not allow function definitions
to keep algorithmic complexity low [20]. Additional functions
can be provided by the library implementations, but this limits
the compatibility of policy interpretation.
2) Execution: The authorization architecture that XACML
assumes is defined by RFC 2753 [21] and 2904 [22], and
defines several structural elements represented in Figure 4.
The Policy Administration Point (PAP) is used to author
and manage policies. The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
is an application-specific component that intercepts requests
to access a resource, and can also perform ‘before’ or ‘after’
actions, called obligations. The PEP checks with the Policy
Decision Point (PDP), a generic component that takes any
request along with a set of policies, and evaluates the request
with respect to the applicable policies. The Policy Information
Point (PIP) retrieves additional attribute values for the PDP not
contained in the request, if required.
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Fig. 4. XACML request processing.
3) Implementations: There are several available XACML
libraries and tools, both open-source and commercial. The
open-source implementations were surveyed and the findings
are presented in Table I.
Impl. Version Last update Sponsors
sunxacml 1.2 Jul 2004 Sun Microsystems
(currently Oracle)
Heras-AF 1.0.0-M2 Sep 2010 U. Applied Sciences
Rapperswil, Switzerland
enterprise r258 Jan 2009 Zian Wang
-java-xacml
PicketBox 3.0.0.Final Feb 2011 JBoss, Red Hat
xEngine beta 0.2 Aug 2010 Michigan State U.,
North Carolina State U.
TABLE I
OPEN-SOURCE XACML IMPLEMENTATIONS.
Sun XACML library is the reference implementation, spon-
sored by Sun Microsystems, but has not been updated since
2004. Since the project has been made publicly available,
several “branches” were created by different sponsors. There
is a 2.0 version under development but its sponsorship is not
clear and it breaks source code compatibility.
HERAS-AF2 [23] is a well documented library. It was
developed in academia, but is currently also used in produc-
2Holistic Enterprise-Ready Application Security Architecture Framework.
tion. The open-source version has only an in-memory policy
repository and the project has been inactive since 2010.
‘enterprise-java-xacml’ has the best reported perfor-
mance [24] but has little documentation.
PicketBox is supported by JBoss and the code appears
to be converging to production-quality but the library is
insufficiently documented at the present time.
XEngine [25] also claims to have the best performance but
it is insufficiently documented and is currently inactive.
HERAS-AF was picked for this research because of the
breadth of available documentation, including open access to
the source code.
IV. SUPPLY CHAIN AUTHORIZATIONS
Access control for supply chains is different from traditional
authorization because there is a lack of prior knowledge about
who should be authorized due to the way that each physical
object path emerges [26].
The Supply Chain Authorization (SC-Az) Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API) has been proposed recently [27] to
allow companies participating in a supply chain to express
their authorizations using business concepts such as item,
company, etc.; and then to enforce the resulting policies using
alternative underlying mechanisms.
The previous SC-Az version had two implementations: Enu-
merated Access Control (EAC) and Chain-of-Communication
Tokens (CCT). EAC uses an Access Control List (ACL)
implementation available on the Java virtual machine3. CCT
represents access rights within object references, called tokens,
implemented with custom code. For this research, we added a
new implementation, Chain-of-Trust Assertions (CTA), based
on the Apache Jena4 Semantic Web [28] library.
A. Chain-of-Trust Assertions
CTA is different from EAC and CCT because its semantics
can be extended. Access rights are expressed using logical
statements, called assertions, issued by the multiple parties.
Figure 5 shows the assertion-related operations.
<<interface>> CTA
+requestAssertion(user, action, resource) : Assertion
+addAssertion(assertion)
+checkAssertions(user, action, resource): Decision
Fig. 5. CTA interface operations.
Access is granted if there is an explicit unbroken chain of
trust assertions leading back to the owner of the data. Figures 6
and 7 show a simple CTA policy stated in Resource Descrip-
tion Framework (RDF) classes and properties, expressed as
subject-predicate-object tuples.
In the example, policy0 created by company0 (data owner)
grants read access to record0 about item0 to company0 and
company1. The extensibility can be achieved by adding new
properties e.g. cta:grantsWrite to grant write access.
3Package sun.security.acl
4http://jena.apache.org/
:company0 a cta:Organization .
:company1 a cta:Organization .
:item0 a cta:Identifier .
:record0 a cta:Record .
:policy0 a cta:Policy .
:company0 cta:publishes :record0 .
:record0 cta:about :item0 .
:company0 cta:creates :policy0 .
:policy0 cta:protects :item0 .
:policy0 cta:grantsRead :company0 .
:policy0 cta:grantsRead :company1 .
Fig. 6. CTA Policy in RDF Turtle format.
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Fig. 7. CTA Policy graph.
B. Conversion to XACML
To convert a CTA policy to a XACML policy the RDF
statements are navigated in the following fashion: first the
objects of “pol protects id” statements are found. For each
item identifier, a XACML policy is created. The policy target
matches the item identifier. A permit rule is created to grant
each access right – e.g. read – to the objects from “pol
grantsRead org” statements. A final catch rule is created so
that all other requests regarding the item are also denied. The
rule combining algorithm is ‘first-applicable’ so the outcome
of the matched first rule is the access decision.
This conversion approach is based on the policy conversions
by Karjoth et al. [29], and it allows SC-Az policy instances
to be represented in the standard XACML format5.
C. Deployment
For the authorizations in the traceability system, XACML
is used as the canonical format for representing data access
policies, both at the EPC IS and DS levels, as depicted in
Figure 1. The policy master copy is maintained at the EPC DS,
but a local copy is maintained in each IS to also protect its
records locally.
5The conversion of EAC and CCT to XACML is described in [27].
D. Related work
WS technologies are already widely used in RFID sys-
tem implementations. The most prominent example is Fos-
strak [30] that provides a SOAP endpoint to the EPC IS event
repository. Also, Guinard [15] developed alternative REST-
based interfaces and explored cloud-based deployment.
Shi et al. [31] implemented a secure DS and used an
extended attribute-based access control to implement fine-
grained access policies in detail. Their custom policy engine is
specialized but does not realize the benefits of using a standard
policy language, making auditing and policy validation harder.
In any case, their engine can be extended to recognize XACML
as an input format.
Kerschbaum and Chaves [32] propose an encryption scheme
that allows different levels of fine-grained access control to be
enforced on each item, also relying on the central role played
by a DS.
V. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
The aim of the performance assessment was to evaluate if
the performance of the solution is suitable for potentially very
large and complex supply chains.
The SC-Az assessment tool [27] was used to perform test
runs to measure both from the ‘raw’ EAC, CCT and CTA
mechanisms and from their XACML-equivalent forms.
The test machine was a Quad-core CPU6 at 2.50 GHz, with
3.25 GB of usable RAM, and 1 TiB hard disk; running 32-bit
Windows 7 (version 6.1.7601), and Java 1.7.0 04.
The policies were defined using the common SC-Az API
to allow the same business needs to be represented internally
by each implementation. The policies were then converted to
XACML format and tested using the HERAS-AF implemen-
tation to assess the correctness and the performance.
A. Evaluation
The data sharing policies were correctly translated and
enforced. The performance results are the average of repeated
runs of the same experiments, to achieve statistical confidence
in the data.
The number of items considered in the experiments were
based on information collected by Ilic et al. [33]. We start with
small number of items (100) and go up to medium number
(104).
1) Raw: Figure 8 presents a plot of the ‘request evaluation’
time for increasing number of policies protecting items.
We can see that the performance of CCT implemented with
custom code is clearly the worse. EAC using Java’s ACLs
and CTA using Apache Jena’s RDF handle the loads much
better with results below 0.1 ms. The reason for this difference
could be that the CCT implementation is stateful whereas EAC
and CTA are stateless. CCT needs to perform (unoptimized)
searches in token collections to find the right token for each
request while the other two receive all the values as arguments.
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Fig. 8. Raw evaluation time with increasing number of policies.
2) XACML: Figure 9 presents a plot of the ‘request evalu-
ation’ time, again for increasing number of policies converted
to XACML format.
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Fig. 9. XACML evaluation time with increasing number of policies.
The performance of CCT and CTA are the best, EAC is
worse, but on the same order of magnitude.
3) Raw vs. XACML: Comparing the y-axis of Figures 8
and 9 it is visible that the XACML performance overheads are
very significant. Table II presents each XACML time divided
by the corresponding ‘raw’ time for chains handling increasing
numbers of items protected by policies. We observed a 400-
fold overhead, on average. Also, the performance overhead
increases with the number of deployed policies.
Nr. Policies EAC CCT CTA
0.01 · 104 49.9 58.9 22.7
0.05 · 104 240.0 63.9 103.5
0.1 · 104 406.7 57.5 191.4
0.5 · 104 1670.1 17.3 752.9
1 · 104 3684.4 10.1 1429.2
TABLE II
XACML OVERHEAD WITH INCREASING NUMBER OF ITEM POLICIES.
VI. CONCLUSION
The first contribution of this paper is the performance
assessment of the enforcement of supply chain data visibility
policies, in the context of an externalized security architecture.
First, we verified that the policies could be translated and
enforced using a standard XACML infrastructure. Then we
compared the performance of the ‘raw’ implementations with
the XACML-converted policies for increasing number of items
being protected. The XACML overheads were found to be very
significant: 400 times on average, and over 1000 times in the
worst cases.
Our results agree with previous research [3] [5] that shows
that WS technologies overheads are usually very significant.
There is a clear need to simplify and streamline the stan-
dards and there is room for performance improvements in
the implementations. However, despite these drawbacks, WS
technologies are being widely used today, meaning that their
advantages – interoperability, flexibility, tooling support – add
value for developers and make up for the additional cost.
That is also the case for using XACML to protect supply
chain data. XACML allows the policies to be exchanged in
a standard format that can be properly interpreted in all the
policy enforcement points and allows the use of other tools
that comply with the standard (e.g. auditing tools).
The second contribution of this work is the extension of
the Supply Chain Authorization (SC-Az) API with the Chain-
of-Trust Assertions (CTA) implementation based on Semantic
Web technologies. CTA has extensible semantics while EAC
and CCT have predefined semantics and, because of this, CTA
was expected to be slower. However, for the SC-Az baseline
when all three mechanisms express exactly the same visibility
restrictions there are no significant performance differences
for evaluation of requests, and CTA is even better than EAC.
Considering that the performance is similar and that CTA is
extensible, moving forward CTA should be the default choice
for expressing supply chain authorizations.
A. Future work
There are indications that the performance overheads re-
ported using the HERAS-AF library could be significantly
lowered with more optimized alternatives [34] [25]. This
proposition needs to be measured in practice before more
general conclusions can be drawn.
The evaluation job execution will be enhanced to measure
the performance of XACML with a large number of items
(more than 104 items [33]). The performance impact of
representing object groupings – batches – and company sets
– groups – will also be assessed.
The suitable performance of CTA opens possibilities for
more expressive traceability data sharing policies. Trust can
be transitive in some cases, as tested already with good pre-
liminary results. Also, instead of issuing plain trust assertions,
parties can issue conditional assertions, like reciprocal trust (“I
trust you if you trust me”). Additionally, special predicates can
be designed to express dynamic chain upstream/downstream
conditions, allowing data sharing (or at least, initial data dis-
covery) between parties that did not have previous interactions.
It can also support the delegation of administrative rights from
one organization to another. All of these can be particularly
useful in scenarios like recalls [35].
The authorization challenges of externalized security in the
supply chain traceability system illustrated how WS can assist
in complex and dynamic business environments involving
multiple organizations. Many more WS research can be done
in this domain as traceability systems requirements are a
worthy match for Web Services’ advanced capabilities.
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